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Introduction 
 
The International Law Commission (ILC or the Commission) has a mandate from 
the U.N. General Assembly (the UNGA or the General Assembly) to codify and 
progressively develop international law.  During most of the ILC’s history, the lion’s 
share of its work product took the form of draft articles adopted by the UNGA as the 
basis for multilateral conventions.  The ILC’s activities received their principal legal 
effect during this period through the United Nations treaty-making process, rather than 
directly on the basis of the ILC’s analysis of what customary international law (CIL or 
custom) does or should require. 
 
In recent decades, however, the ILC has self-consciously limited its efforts to 
codify or progressively develop international law in the form of multilateral conventions.  
Instead, it has turned to other outputs—such as principles, conclusions, and draft articles 
that it does not recommend be turned into treaties. Significantly, the Commission often 
claims that these outputs reflect CIL.  For example, despite recommending that the 
General Assembly not base a treaty on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the ILC 
as well as many states and commentators assert that the draft articles largely reflect CIL.   
 
This change in behavior presents a puzzle.  If the ILC is still engaged in 
codification and progressive development, why has it changed the form of the work it 
produces? In this chapter, we argue that increasing political gridlock in the General 
Assembly—by which we mean a division of views over the substance of international 
norms and lack of enthusiasm for convening multilateral diplomatic conferences—has led 
the Commission to modify the form of its work to preserve its influence in shaping the 
evolution of international law.  More specifically, we argue that the reduced likelihood of 
the General Assembly adopting draft articles as treaties closes off the primary mechanism 
of ILC influence.  In addition, if the UNGA or member states reject an ILC 
recommendation that its draft articles become treaties, that rejection may suggest that the 
work product does not reflect existing custom—an alternative mechanism of ILC                                                         
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influence.  To avoid these negative outcomes, we expect the ILC to turn to other outputs 
that allow it to continue to influence CIL without the General Assembly’s approval.  
 
This chapter makes three contributions to the study of the ILC and custom.1 First, 
we use principal-agent theory to model the relationship between the General Assembly 
and the Commission and how that relationship has evolved over time. Second, drawing 
upon a new data set that codes all ILC outputs since 1947, we show that the Commission 
began to favor non-treaty outputs beginning in the early 1990s. This followed a decade 
when ILC treaty recommendations were not adopted by the UNGA or, if adopted, did not 
garner sufficient ratifications for the treaties to enter into force. Third, we argue that the 
shift away from draft treaties increases the salience of the methodology that the ILC uses 
to enhance its influence when the traditional constraint of UNGA review is unavailable 
due to gridlock.  
 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. We begin by briefly reviewing 
the ILC’s mandate to codify and progressively develop international law.  We then use 
principal-agent theory to analyze the relationship between the General Assembly and the 
Commission. We argue that the ILC chooses the work product that maximizes its 
influence among states and other actors, subject to its expectations of how the UNGA 
will respond to its work.  Our core claim is that, as gridlock in the General Assembly has 
limited its ability either to adopt treaties or decisively reject non-treaty outputs, the 
Commission has had both the incentive and the discretion to choose other outputs that do 
not require General Assembly approval. We proceed to provide empirical support for this 
claim, documenting the ILC’s shift away from recommending to the UNGA that draft 
articles be adopted as treaties.  
 
After establishing this empirical claim, we explain why methodology acts as a 
constraint on the ILC even if it does not similarly limit other actors’ claims about the 
content of custom. More specifically, we argue that the methodology that the ILC uses to 
prepare non-treaty outputs functions as a de facto substitute for the political blessing 
associated with the UNGA’s adoption of draft treaty articles. Adherence to methodology 
increases the likelihood that a wider audience—government officials, international 
judges, national courts and non-state actors—will accept the ILC’s non-treaty work 
products as valid statements of CIL. We thus expect the Commission to select a 
methodological approach that it expects will be supported by the audience(s) it hopes to 
persuade. We find suggestive evidence of this behavior in the ILC’s recent project on 
foreign official immunity.  We conclude by identifying what we should expect to observe 
in future ILC work if our claims are correct.                                                         
1 We are not the first to examine changes in the ILC’s work product over time. Previous studies 
that offer a range of normative approaches and illustrations include: Frank Berman, The ILC within the 
UN’s Legal Framework: Its Relationship with the Sixth Committee, 49 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 107 (2006); 
David D. Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship between Form 
and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 857 (2002); Jacob Katz Cogan, The Changing Form of the International 
Law Commission’s Work 275, 278-79, in EVOLUTIONS IN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
(Robert Virzo & Ivan Ingravallo, eds., 2015); Sean D. Murphy, Codification, Progressive Development, or 
Scholarly Analysis? The Art of Packaging the ILC’s Work Product 29, in THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR IAN BROWNLIE (Maurizio Ragazzi ed. 2013). 
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Gridlock and its wages 
 
Article 13 of the UN Charter tasks the General Assembly with, among other 
things, “encouraging the progressive development of international law and its 
codification.”2  The General Assembly, in turn, has delegated this responsibility to the 
ILC in the Statute of the International Law Commission (hereinafter the “ILC Statute” or 
the “Statute”).3  The ILC is therefore an agent of the General Assembly, operating within 
both the legal limits and political constraints imposed upon it by that UN body. 4  
Principal-agent theory can help explain the changing role of the ILC in the codification 
and progressive development of international law. In this section, we analyze the 
relationship between the General Assembly and the ILC in light of principal-agent 
theory.  Our central claim is that the increasing gridlock in the General Assembly over 
time has constrained the ILC’s ability to carry out what has historically been its primary 
function of drafting treaties. These constraints have led the ILC to look for new ways to 
influence the formation and codification of CIL. We demonstrate this claim empirically 
with a comprehensive review of how the ILC’s output has changed since its inception in 
1947, as well as concrete anecdotes drawn from current efforts to prepare draft articles on 
the immunity of foreign officials from criminal jurisdiction.  
 
The ILC’s mandate 
 
Mirroring the language in Article 13 of the UN Charter, the ILC Statute charges 
the Commission with “the promotion of the progressive development of international law 
and its codification.”5 As a formal matter, the Statute treats progressive development and 
codification differently. The Statute defines progressive development as the “preparation 
of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law 
or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of 
states.” 6  Codification, on the other hand, means “the more precise formulation and 
systematization of rules of international law in fields where there already has been 
extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine.” 7  The Statute underscores this 
distinction by establishing somewhat different procedures for the ILC to follow 
depending on its task.8  
                                                         
2 UN Charter, art. 13. 
3 Statute of the International Law Commission, adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 
174 (II) of 21 November 1947, as amended by resolutions 485 (V) of 12 December 1950, 984 (X) of 3 
December 1955, 985 (X) of 3 December 1955 and 36/39 of 18 November 1981. 
4 Cf. Cogan, supra note 1, at 278-79 (“The ILC’s role, therefore, was to assist States in their 
lawmaking function by thoroughly researching and debating topics in need of codification and drafting 
texts that could then be used as starting points by States in their treaty negotiations.”). 
5 ILC Statute, art. 1(1). 
6 Id., art. 15. 
7 Id.  
8 See id., arts. 16-24.  The principal difference is that the procedures for codification focus on 
collecting information from governments about state practice and reaching conclusions on the basis of that 
practice, while progressive development involves consulting with expert and technical bodies and other 
international organizations with relevant expertise. 
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These definitions are connected to the output the General Assembly expects. 
Where the ILC engages in progressive development, the Statute contemplates draft 
conventions; where it engages in codification, the ILC is given wider latitude with regard 
to the form of its product. More specifically, when engaged in codification the Statute 
directs the ILC to submit a report to the General Assembly with a recommendation as to 
whether to: (1) take no action; (2) adopt the report; (3) adopt draft articles submitted by 
the ILC; or (4) convene a diplomatic conference to negotiate a convention.9  
 
No matter the task it is engaged in or its final product, however, the Statute 
envisions a supervisory role for the General Assembly. Proposals for progressive 
development come from the General Assembly, UN members, or other international 
organizations.10 Where codification is concerned, the ILC has leeway to select its own 
topics, but it is required both to submit its recommendations for topics to the General 
Assembly, and to give priority to requests from the General Assembly.11 The Statute 
mandates an opportunity for UN member states to comment on the ILC’s drafts or 
provide information about their practices.12 
 
Whichever track the ILC chooses, its final product is reported annually to the 
General Assembly—in particular the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, which 
deals with legal affairs—for review and action. The Sixth Committee considers these 
reports each fall. This review of these reports gives states an additional opportunity to 
opine on the ILC’s progress and provide input and direction on an ongoing basis. Even 
where the Sixth Committee does not formally endorse or reject the ILC’s work product, 
member state comments provided on the Commission’s annual reports and after initial 
readings of projects implicitly shape the ILC’s activities by indicating the kind of 
reception that its final products will receive in the UNGA (and, in the case of proposed 
conventions, the likelihood of ratification and entry into force).  Ultimately, however, the 
General Assembly “has the final say on the disposition of the Commission’s drafts.  It 
can approve them, send them back for redrafting, or reject them.”13  
 
 Principal-agent theory and the UNGA-ILC relationship 
 
Principal-agent theory helps to understand the relationship between the ILC and 
the General Assembly, and in particular how that relationship has changed over time.  
The theory, which has been widely applied to the study legal institutions,14 including 
international organizations, 15  builds upon rational-choice theories of domestic and                                                         
9 Id., art. 23. 
10 Id., art 16-17. 
11 Id., art. 18. 
12 Id., arts. 16(h), 17(b), 19.2, & 21.2. 
13 H.W. Briggs, The Work of the International Law Commission, 17 JAG J. 56, 80 (1963).  
14  See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992); Randall, Calvert, Mathew McCubbins and Barry Weingast, A 
Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588 (1989).  
15 See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Economic Structure of the Law of International Organizations, 
15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 162 (2014); Manfred Elsig, Principal-Agent Theory and the World Trade Organization: 
Complex Agency and “Missing Delegation,” 17 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 495 (2011); Andrew T. Guzman & 
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international politics.  It posits that self-interested actors involved in governance and 
policymaking—such as voters or legislators at the domestic level, and states at the 
international level—delegate power to other actors—such as domestic administrative 
agencies or international organizations—to provide benefits that the principals could not 
achieve on their own.   
 
Delegating may be desirable for a number of reasons—because the agent can 
perform a task more efficiently, has superior knowledge or experience, or because the 
principal has limited time or resources. For example, the General Assembly delegated to 
the ILC its responsibilities under Article 13 of the UN Charter because of the ILC’s 
distinctive expertise in international law. The ILC can draw on its members’ specialized 
knowledge and experience to prepare draft texts that more accurately assess existing state 
practice and opinio juris. The ILC might also be able to prepare these texts more 
efficiently than the General Assembly due to its significantly smaller size and the fact 
that its members serve in their personal capacities rather than as representatives of states. 
 
The advantages of delegation are substantial, but they can also entail considerable 
costs.16  In particular, in carrying out their assigned tasks agents may seek to further their 
own interests rather than those of the principals.  The mechanisms used to deter such 
behavior are a central focus of principal-agent theory.  These tools can be applied ex ante 
(for example, by controlling the appointment of agents and precisely defining their 
mandate), contemporaneously (by reviewing agents’ activities and decisions), and ex post 
(via reporting requirements, revisions to the terms of the delegation, and, in extreme 
cases, sanctions).  All of these mechanisms are costly, however.  The principal is thus 
unlikely to devote the resources required to ensure that an agent is perfectly faithful to the 
principal’s charge.17 
 
Numerous provisions of the ILC Statute reveal the mechanisms by which the 
General Assembly can influence the Commission and its work.  The UNGA is 
responsible for electing ILC members (Article 3), proposing topics for its consideration 
(Article 16), approving topics submitted by member states and IOs (Article 17), 
evaluating draft articles (Article 16, para. (j)), reviewing topics proposed by the 
Commission (Article 18), commenting on draft Articles (Article 20), reviewing final 
drafts (Article 22), and returning such drafts to the Commission for further consideration 
(Article 23). 18  In addition to or instead of these formal oversight mechanisms, the 
General Assembly can use informal mechanisms, such as providing feedback on topics                                                                                                                                                                      
Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1693 (2008); Daniel L. Nielson 
and Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank 
Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 (2003). 
16 Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of Delegation, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 
(2008). 
17  See Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of 
Administrative Process and Judicial Review, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 347 (1997). 
18  JEFFREY S. MORTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3 
(2000); see also B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: ITS APPROACH TO THE 
CODIFICATION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1977) (“the [ILC] is in a 
subordinate relationship to the General Assembly” and “subject to [its] supervision and control”). 
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the Commission has proposed, to exercise de facto oversight over the ILC. 
 
Characterizing the UNGA-ILC relationship as one of principal and agent does 
not, however, imply that the Commission does or should merely carry out the General 
Assembly’s wishes.  To the contrary, principal-agent theory, which assumes that agents 
have their own preferences, is fully compatible with international delegations that give 
agents broad independence and discretion.  “Far from presupposing that agents slavishly 
follow the preferences of their principals, PA [principal-agent] analyses give us a 
theoretical language for problematizing and generating testable hypotheses about the 
sources and the extent of agents’ autonomy and influence.”19 
 
Nearly seven decades of codification and progressive development work, which 
we describe in detail below, reveal how the Commission’s independence, expertise and 
discretion operate in practice.  The Sixth Committee and the General Assembly have 
frequently approved the draft articles and other legal texts that the Commission has 
prepared with relatively little modification.  But not always.  In 1953, for example, when 
the ILC urged the adoption of draft articles on the Continental Shelf and High Seas 
Fisheries, “the General Assembly declined to comply with the Commission's 
recommendation” and directed it to prepare a comprehensive text on the law of the sea.20  
Five years later, the ILC produced a draft Convention on Model Rules on Arbitration 
Procedures. “The U.N. General Assembly rejected the draft and merely took note of these 
‘Model Rules,’ which were never implemented.”21  Similarly, ILC’s work in preparing 
the U.N. Watercourses Convention “was not linear: different approaches were tested and 
some were rejected, in part as a result of information received through the annual 
interaction between the Commission and the U.N. General Assembly.”22 These examples 
reveal that the UNGA was not merely a rubber stamp for the ILC’s work. 
 
That the instances of outright UNGA rejection are few suggests that the 
Commission is highly adept at performing the expert tasks entrusted to it by the ILC 
Statute.  But such a pattern is also consistent with an agent operating in the shadow of 
what it anticipates the principal will accept.  As Jeffrey Morton has explained: 
 
[T]he commission generally seeks to ascertain rules which are likely to be 
useful to states in the conduct of their relations, bears in mind what rules 
and formulations states are likely to agree to and, on the basis of its                                                         
19  Mark Pollack, Principal-Agent Analysis and International Delegation: Red Herrings, 
Theoretical Clarifications, and Empirical Disputes, Bruges Political Research Papers No. 2, at 5-6 (Feb. 
2007); see also CARMEN PAVEL, DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE LIMITS 
OF STATE AUTHORITY 54 (2015) (“nothing in the principal-agent model entails a dominating relationship”).  
Agents with extensive independence, such as international courts, are often referred to as “trustees.”  E.g., 
Manfred Elsig and Mark Pollack, Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: The Politics of Judicial 
Appointment at the World Trade Organization, 20 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 391 (2014). 
20 Briggs, supra note 13, at 58. 
21 Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement and International Law, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 65, 70 (1997). 
22 Stephen C. McCaffrey, The 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention: Retrospect and Prospect, 21 
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 165, 166 (1997). 
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assessment of these two questions, proceeds to examine and deal with 
each topic.  The pragmatic approach of the [ILC] limits, to a large degree, 
both the sources and subjects of international law that are considered 
legitimate.23 
 
As the conditions under which the principals’ review and control of agents change, 
however, so to do the activities and decisions undertaken by the agents, especially those 
whose mandate gives them a high degree of autonomy. 
 
Expected ILC behavior under conditions of increasing UNGA gridlock 
 
As we have explained, principal-agent relationships give agents a range of 
discretion to act independently.  The degree of discretion is a function of the terms of the 
delegation and the principal’s supervision costs. As supervising the agent becomes more 
costly, the principal is less likely to do so. As such costs decline, an agent becomes more 
constrained. It follows that changes in the principal’s supervision costs can result in shifts 
in the relationship between the principal and the agent. 
 
The principal’s decision-making rules are a key determinant of its supervision 
costs.24 In collective bodies, such as the General Assembly, rejecting action by the ILC 
requires the affirmative vote of no more than a majority of voting members. Where a 
body operates by consensus, as the UNGA Sixth Committee does in practice,25 as few as 
one dissenting vote can result in rejection. Moreover, the ILC may self-discipline, even 
without a formal vote, where a minority of states strongly opposes a particular proposal.26 
These decision rules raise the cost of supervision, but they tend to remain constant over 
time.27  Supervision costs do increase, however, in response to a rise in the number of 
members of a collective body and in the heterogeneity of their preferences. We thus 
expect that as the UNGA becomes larger and more diverse, and as its members’ views on 
particular international law topics diverge, its costs of supervising the ILC will also rise.  
 
These insights help to explain changes in how the ILC has pursued its delegated 
task of codifying and progressively developing international law. The ILC’s influence 
depends on the extent to which states and other actors accept and follow the legal 
instruments it promulgates. As explained above, the ILC Statute presents the Commission 
with a basic choice that shapes its ability to maximize this influence. The ILC can seek to 
have its work adopted by the General Assembly and, ultimately, states as a treaty. 
Alternatively, it can submit other work products—such as “principles” or                                                         
23 MORTON, supra note 18, at 2-3 (discussing RAMCHARAN, supra note 18). 
24 Other supervision costs include the cost of informing oneself about the agent’s actions. 
25  See, e.g., Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Approving 16 Draft Resolutions, Legal Committee 
Continues Tradition of Consensus in Session’s Final Debate, GA/L/3473 (Nov. 15, 2013).   
26 We are grateful to Sean Murphy for this point.  
27 Similarly, the time and effort devoted to analyzing the ILC’s annual reports—which can run to 
300 pages, cover a wide range of legal issues, and must done in the two-month period between the ILC’s 
submission of the report and the debate in the Sixth Committee—represents a supervision cost. These costs 
may have risen over time to the extent that the length of reports has increased, an issue outside the scope of 
this chapter. 
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“conclusions”—or it can prepare draft articles without recommending that the UNGA 
adopt them as a treaty. These latter outputs resemble restatements of U.S. law. They 
synthesize, memorialize, and sometimes shift the meaning of existing international rules, 
but the instrument itself does not take on legally binding status. Critically, turning the 
ILC’s final product into a treaty requires affirmative approval by the General 
Assembly 28 —something that becomes less likely as gridlock increases.  The ILC’s 
“restatements,” however, can influence CIL without UNGA action. For example, states 
and international tribunals may cite the ILC’s work as authoritative, as has often occurred 
for the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.  To be sure, the General Assembly retains 
the power to disapprove of the Commission’s non-treaty outputs. But under conditions of 
gridlock, such disapprovals will be rare. 
 
We thus expect the ILC to choose the form of work product that maximizes its 
influence among states, subject to its expectations of how the UNGA will respond to its 
work. We are not alone in this making claim. As David Caron has argued, “it is entirely 
proper for the ILC to consider the endgame of its work product, and to take account of 
possible dysfunctions in the state system generally or relating to a particular topic.”29 To 
our knowledge, however, we are the first to put forward a theory of ILC influence using 
principal-agent theory.  
 
Specifically, we expect the ILC to recommend that the General Assembly adopt 
its draft articles as a treaty if it believes the treaty is likely to be adopted and enter into 
force. The political endorsement of the ILC’s work by the UNGA that comes with the 
treaty-making process makes subsequent adherence by states more likely, all else equal. 
Similarly, the markers of state acceptance that accompany treaty ratifications remove the 
uncertainty as to the existence and scope of a legal obligation that often accompany CIL.  
 
By contrast, as gridlock increases the likelihood of General Assembly inaction, 
we expect the ILC to turn to other legal outputs. This enhanced risk of inaction could 
flow from political polarization within the General Assembly. Alternatively, it could be 
the result of the ILC considering issues on which states have more heterogeneous 
preferences. Arguably, the ILC’s current work program includes topics that are more 
difficult than its earlier work codifying, for example, the law of treaties or diplomatic 
relations.  
 
The causes of polarization do not affect our prediction, however. Rather, our 
focus is only on the effects of UNGA polarization—whatever its causes—on ILC 
behavior. Specifically, we predict that polarization increases the probability of inaction 
by the UNGA. Inaction, in turn, induces the ILC to increase the influence of its outputs                                                         
28 Although creating international obligations via a treaty ultimately requires states individually 
consent to the agreement, the adoption of a treaty by an international organization or diplomatic conference 
is a critical prior step. Adoption represents a collective decision by the member states to proceed with the 
instrument. Adoption gives all member states—including those that have no intention of signing or 
ratifying the agreement—the chance to decide whether the treaty will even be opened for signature, as well 
as to influence its content. See Timothy Meyer, From Contract to Legislation: The Logic of Modern 
International Lawmaking, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 559 (2014).  
29 Caron, supra note 1, at 866. 
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through means other than General Assembly approval. Restatements, principles, and 
other non-binding codifications of particular international law topics allow the ILC to 
achieve this result.  
 
In sum, principal-agent theory leads us to predict that the ILC—an institution that 
seeks to influence the content of international law—will have greater control over the 
form and content of its work product as the likelihood of gridlock and inaction in the 
General Assembly rises. If the Commission expects to the UNGA to approve its work, we 
expect the ILC to prefer the treaty-making route. In contrast, if it expects that gridlock 
will prevent a treaty’s adoption, the ILC will seek other pathways to enhance its 
influence. As we explain below, the historical record provides support for our claim, 
revealing that the ILC has shifted over time from treaty-making to “restatements” and 
other non-treaty outputs. 
 
The shift from treaties to non-binding codifications 
 
For most of its history, the ILC has submitted draft articles to the General 
Assembly with a recommendation that the articles form the basis for a convention.30 This 
preference for proposing treaties reflects, in part, the fact that the distinction between 
codification and progressive development has been elusive in practice. 31  As Hersch 
Lauterpacht has written: 
[T]here is very little to codify if by that term is meant no more than giving, 
[in the language of ILC statute Article 15], precision and systematic order 
to rules of international law . . .  once we approach at close quarters 
practically any branch of international law, we are driven, amidst some 
feeling of incredulity, to the conclusion that although there is as a rule a 
consensus of opinion on broad principle . . . there is no semblance of 
agreement in relation to specific rules and problems.32 
Most topics that the ILC undertakes involve a mix of identifying abstract rules on 
which states agree (codification) and attempting to propose solutions about rules on 
which they do not agree (progressive development).33 Because the distinction has been 
difficult to maintain in practice, the ILC in its first half-century usually opted for treaties 
as the preferred outcome, generally eschewing the “reports” and other outputs that the 
ILC Statute contemplates when the Commission is engaged in codification. The political 
blessing that came with recommending treaties papered over the question of whether the 
draft articles were in fact CIL supported by state practice and opinio juris (as required for 
codification). 
                                                         
30 See Cogan, supra note 1, at 278.  
31 Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1008 (2012). 
32 Hersch Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International Law, 49 AM. J. INT’L L. 16 , 
17 (1955). 
33 Meyer, supra note 31, at 1008 (arguing that in practice “codification has been an exercise in 
identifying areas of custom and attempting to fill in the gaps.”). 
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Table 1 below34 illustrates the dominance of treaty recommendations prior to the 
turn of the century. It displays three sets of data: (1) the number of projects completed in 
roughly each third of the ILC’s existence, classifying projects into time periods based on 
the date the ILC completed the project; (2) the ILC’s recommendation as to whether to 
pursue a treaty; and (3) whether a treaty has in fact entered into force.  Between 1947 and 
1999, the Commission’s consistent practice was to “recommend to the General Assembly 
the elaboration of a convention on the basis of the draft articles.”35 During that period, 
the ILC completed 30 projects. The ILC concluded 20 of those projects by 
recommending a convention. By and large, the General Assembly collectively, and states 
individually, agreed. 14 of the 20 recommended conventions were adopted and have 
entered into force—a success rate of 70%. This success rate is even higher in the first 
twenty-five years of the Commission’s work, from 1949-1974. During that period the 
Commission recommended 14 conventions out of 21 completed projects. 12 of those 14 
entered into force, for a success rate of 86% (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
 
  1947-1999 
1947-
1974 1975-1999 2000-2014 
Projects Completed  30 21 9 12 
Convention Recommended  20 14 6 2 
Convention recommended and in 
Force  14 12 2 0 
Success Rate 70% 86% 33% 0% 
 
The twenty-first century, by contrast, has seen the ILC shift away from work 
products that are intended to become treaties. From 2000 to 2014, the Commission 
completed 12 projects. Of those, it recommended a treaty in only two instances—the 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, and Diplomatic 
Protection. As of March 2015, the UNGA had not adopted either recommendation—a 
success rate of 0%.36  
 
Figure 1 reproduces the data in a graphical format with two additions—the 
number of projects for which the Commission did not recommend a treaty, and 
discontinued projects. Figure 1 illustrates the stark decline in recommended treaties and 
the concomitant rise in outputs that the Commission does not contemplate becoming                                                         
34 The tables and figures in this section are based on authors’ coding of all ILC outputs since 1947.  
The coding is based on data obtained from a four-volume treatise that comprehensively analyzes the 
Commission’s work. ARTHUR WATTS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, 1949-1998 (1999) (3 vols.); 
MICHAEL WOOD & ARNOLD PRONTO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, 1999-2009 (2011). More 
recent information was obtained from the ILC website, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/.    
35 ILC Statute, art. 13. 
36 The UNGA adopted the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State in 2004. However, 
the ILC completed its work on jurisdictional immunities in 1991, and thus we include this project in the 
1974-1999 period. 
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treaties. Since 1975 the Commission has proposed a total of eight treaties, of which only 
two are in force—a 25% success rate (see Figure 1). In contrast, over two-thirds of ILC 
projects ending in the same period, including discontinued topics, concluded without the 
ILC recommending a treaty (17 of 25, or 68%). This percentage rises to a striking 85% 
(11 of 13) for projects ending between 2000 and 2014. 
 
 
 
A more fine-grained look at our dataset of ILC outputs sheds light on the 
interaction between the General Assembly’s behavior and the Commission’s 
recommendations. In the 1980s, the Commission completed only three projects (see 
Figure 2). In each instance, the ILC recommended a convention, and in each instance the 
proposed convention failed to enter into force.37 While the number of observations is too 
small to draw firm conclusions, the small number of projects completed—and their 
lukewarm reception from states—suggests that the ILC may have concluded that it could 
no longer expect to influence the evolution of international law via treaty proposals.  
 
Figure 2 reveals that the slow pace of the Commission’s work continued through 
1990s, a decade during which the ILC completed five projects, recommending 
conventions in only three instances. Of those three, only two have entered into force. But 
the way in which they have done so is suggestive of dissensus among states even when 
the General Assembly adopts a draft treaty. The Convention on the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses, for example, was adopted in 1997 but only obtained 
the minimum necessary 35 ratifications in 2014.  
 
                                                        
37 The two conventions adopted by the UNGA that did not enter into force are State Succession in 
Respect of Property, Archives, and Debt and Treaties with International Organizations. The General 
Assembly did not adopt the third proposed treaty on Diplomatic Couriers.  
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Given this declining success rate, it is hardly surprising that the ILC has turned 
almost exclusively to non-treaty outputs. Perhaps the most prominent example of this 
shift is the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility. The ILC adopted the draft 
articles in 2001 and submitted them to the General Assembly with a recommendation 
only that the UNGA “take note” of the draft articles. This recommendation followed 
guidance from a number of countries (including China, Japan, and the United Kingdom, 
and the United States) that, in the words of Special Rapporteur James Crawford, worried 
that states would not:  
 
see it in their interests to ratify an eventual treaty, rather than relying on 
particular aspects of it as the occasion arises. They [the countries opposing 
a draft treaty based on the ILC’s draft articles] note the destabilizing and 
even “decodifying” effect that an unsuccessful convention may have. In 
their view it is more realistic, and is likely to be more effective, to rely on 
international courts and tribunals, on State practice and doctrine to adopt 
and apply the rules in the text. These will have more influence on 
international law in the form of a declaration or other approved statement 
than they would if included in an unratified and possibly controversial 
treaty.38 
 
As Crawford makes clear, divisions among states made the adoption and entry 
into force of a convention on state responsibility unlikely. Given this fact, the ILC had to 
consider how to enhance the influence of its work. Bypassing the treaty-making process 
was deemed the best approach, both because it denied states the opportunity to formally 
express disagreement with aspects of the draft articles and because it opened other 
avenues—the disaggregated and relatively uncoordinated actions of states and                                                         
38 James Crawford, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN. 4/517, para. 23 (2001). 
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international tribunals and organizations—for the ILC’s work to gain traction.39   
 
More recently, other conflicts have arisen in the General Assembly regarding ILC 
outputs. In its 2013 end of year review of the Commission’s work, a number of states in 
the Sixth Committee challenged the form of two sets of draft articles—on Transboundary 
Harm from Hazardous Activities and on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers. The United 
States, for example, argued that both texts “went beyond the present state of international 
law and practice . . . [and] were designed as resources to encourage national and 
international action in specific contexts, rather than to form the basis of a global treaty. 
Therefore, [the United States] expressed support for retaining them in their current 
form.”40 Similarly, in discussing the Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, Bahrain 
(on behalf of the Arab Group) called for more scientific research on the topic and further 
study of state practice before the draft articles could be turned into a treaty.41  
 
The Commission’s ongoing projects continue this trend towards non-binding 
codifications. Because the ILC has not yet made a recommendation to the General 
Assembly regarding these projects, we omit them from the data reported in Figures 1 and 
2. Nevertheless, the Commission already appears committed to pursuing non-binding 
codifications in its current projects on the Identification of Customary International 
Law 42  and the Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice in relation to the 
Interpretation of Treaties,43 both of which will result in “conclusions.” Moreover, the 
project on the Protection of the Atmosphere is likely to end in non-binding 
“Guidelines,” 44 while the ILC’s second study of the most-favored nation clause will 
conclude with just a report.45 
 
One ongoing project for which the Commission is preparing draft articles—the 
immunity of foreign officials from criminal jurisdiction (foreign official immunity)—
provides an especially apt example of how disagreement in the General Assembly can 
stall treaty-making in the ILC.46 The Commission added foreign official immunity to its 
work program in 2006. Its work began in earnest with the appointment of Roman 
Kolodkin of Russia as the Special Rapporteur. During his tenure in that position, 
Kolodkin wrote three reports on the immunity of state officials: a Preliminary Report in 
2008, 47  a Second Report in 2010, 48  and a Third Report in 2011. 49  In 2012, with                                                         
39 See Caron, supra note 1, at 864 (“[W]eaving through this debate [in the ILC] on the likely 
outcome of traditional lawmaking processes were estimations that the ILC’s articles would have as much, if 
not more, influence if the attempt were not made to put them in a treaty form.”). 
40 Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Praising Draft Texts on Transboundary Harm, Aquifers, Allocation 
of Loss, Delegates Disagree over Final Forms, Seek Further Examination, GA/L/3464 (Oct. 22, 2013).   
41 Id.   
42 See Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n ¶¶ 66-76, U.N. Doc. A/69/10 (2014). 
43 See Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n ¶¶ 133-185, U.N. Doc. A/69/10 (2014). 
44 See Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n ¶¶ 218-28, U.N. Doc. A/69/10 (2014). 
45 See Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n ¶¶ 262-64, U.N. Doc. A/69/10 (2014). 
46 It is worth recalling that although it is preparing draft articles, the Commission does not have to 
choose whether to recommend a treaty until it completes its work.  
47 Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int’l 
Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/601 (May 29, 2008) (by Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin).   
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Kolodkin’s departure from the ILC, the Commission appointed a new Special 
Rapporteur, Concepcion Escobar Hernandez. To date, Escobar Hernandez has produced a 
Preliminary Report,50 a Second Report,51 and a Third Report.52 Additionally, Escobar 
Hernandez proposed several draft articles in connection with her Second and Third 
Reports. The Commission referred these articles to the drafting committee. After some 
modifications by the drafting committee, the ILC Plenary adopted the draft articles.53 
 
Two related issues have animated debates within the ILC on foreign official 
immunity.  The first is the scope of, and any exceptions to, the immunity of foreign 
officials. The second is the extent to which the Commission should engage in codification 
versus progressive development. Kolodkin, the first Special Rapporteur, generally 
favored codifying existing state practice—an approach that many members of the 
Commission indicated would result in broad immunity for foreign officials. Escobar 
Hernandez’s approach was different. Following the suggestion of many members who 
were critical of Kolodkin’s reports, Escobar Hernandez indicated that she did not intend 
to undertake a codification exercise limited to extant custom, but would include elements 
of progressive development as well. 54   She also stressed the need to base the 
Commission’s work on “the current values of the international community.”55    
 
The sharp divisions and strongly held beliefs on these questions are also apparent 
in the General Assembly’s review of the ILC’s work. State representatives have taken 
conflicting positions on virtually every key issue with which the Commission is 
grappling, making it difficult to prepare draft articles that are likely to win favor in the 
General Assembly. For example, on the question of codification versus progressive 
development, several delegates urged the Commission to focus on “reviewing and 
summarizing relevant practices and rules” of immunity instead of establishing new 
immunity rules. 56   By contrast, others urged the Commission to follow Escobar 
                                                                                                                                                                     
48 Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int’l Law 
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/631 (June 10, 2010) (by Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin). 
49 Third Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int’l Law 
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/646 (May 24, 2011) (by Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin). 
50 Preliminary Report on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int’l 
L.aw Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/654 (31 May 2012) (by Concepcion Escobar Hernandez) [hereinafter 
“Hernandez Preliminary Report”].   
51 Second Report on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int’l Law 
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/661(4 April 2013) (by Concepcion Escobar Hernandez).   
52 Third Report on the Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, Int’l Law 
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/673 (2 June, 2014) (by Concepcion Escobar Hernandez) [hereinafter 
“Escobar Hernandez Third Report”]. 
53 Text of Draft articles 1, 3 and 4 provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee at the sixty-
fifth session of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.814 (4 June 2013); Text of Draft 
articles 2(e) and 5 provisionally adopted at the sixty-sixth session of the International Law Commission, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.850 (15 July 2014).    
54  Preliminary Summary Record of the 3143rd Meeting [10 July 2012], U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SR.3143, 4. 
55 Hernandez Preliminary Report, supra note 50, at para. 67. 
56  Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Delegations Urge Expanded ‘Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’ 
Immunity for Broader Range of State Officials, GA/L/3448 (Nov. 5, 2012); see also Press Release, U.N. 
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Hernandez’s recommendation that the Commission consider the issue from both the 
perspective of lex lata and lex ferenda.57 States also divided on the scope of official 
immunity. Some delegations, like Greece and South Korea, urged the Commission to 
include exceptions to immunity for the most serious international crimes. 58  African 
countries such as Kenya and Algeria expressed greater skepticism that state practice 
supported such exceptions.59 Delegations similarly took opposing views on what the 
outcome of the ILC’s process should be, with some suggesting a binding treaty and 
others urging a non-binding instrument.60  
 
The most telling example of the gridlock within the General Assembly on foreign 
immunity questions, however, is not what state representatives have said about the ILC’s 
work on foreign official immunity. Rather, it is the fact that the General Assembly has 
initiated its own parallel investigation into the topic of universal jurisdiction—an issue 
that is inextricably linked to the immunity of foreign officials from domestic criminal 
prosecution. The General Assembly took up this investigation at the urging of Tanzania, 
which in July 2009 submitted a request to include “the subject and scope of universal 
jurisdiction” on the General Assembly’s agenda. 61 In so doing, Tanzania acted on behalf 
of the African Group, which had previously adopted a resolution calling for 
“exhaustive[]” discussions at the U.N. in response to the indictments “issued in some 
European States against African leaders.” 62   The Tanzanian request noted similar 
concerns, including the “ad hoc and arbitrary application [of the principle], particularly 
towards African leaders.”63  
 
The General Assembly assigned the matter to the Sixth Committee—the same 
body which reviews the ILC’s work. 64  In meetings in 2009 and 2010, State 
representatives expressed widely divergent views, with a number expressly linking                                                                                                                                                                      
GAOR, Natural Disaster Relief Draft Articles Need Clearer Parameters, Argue Delegates as Legal 
Committee Continues Review of International Law Commission Report, GA/L/3447 (Nov. 2, 2012).   
57 Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Natural Disaster Relief Draft Articles Need Clearer Parameters, 
Argue Delegates as Legal Committee Continues Review of International Law Commission Report, 
GA/L/3447 (Nov. 2, 2012) (for example, the Austrian representative urged that “the starting point must be 
the identification of existing norms of international law, followed by possible progressive development in 
accordance with the present needs of the international community.”).   
58 Press Release, U.N. GAOR, As Review of International Law Commission Report Continues, 
Legal Committee Tackles Definitions, Interpretations of Draft Texts, GA/L/3466 (Oct. 29, 2013). 
59 Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Immunity of State Officials Remains at Issue as Committee Ends 
Review of International Law Commission Report, GA/L/3428 (Nov. 4, 2011). 
60 Id. 
61 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United 
Nations Secretary-General, Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Sixty-
Third Session, A/63/237/Rev.1 (July 23, 2009). 
62 Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Doc. Assembly/AU/11 (XIII) 
at ¶¶ 3, 4 (Jul. 3, 2009).  
63 Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Sixth Committee, Legal Committee Delegates See Principle of 
Universal Law as Safeguard Against Impunity for Major Crimes; Some Caution on Risk of Abuse, 
GA/L/3371 (Oct. 20, 2009) [2009 Sixth Committee Meeting].  
64  Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Sixth Committee Delegates Discuss Ways to Further Review 
Complex, Controversial Issues of Applying Universal Legal Jurisdiction:  Some Say Principle Subject to 
Abuse, Violating Existing Law, GA/L/3392 (Oct. 13, 2010).   
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universal jurisdiction to the scope of foreign official immunity. Delegates from African 
and Asian countries stressed that the application of universal jurisdiction must be 
consistent with the principles of sovereign and foreign official immunity.65 In contrast, 
delegates from Europe and Latin America generally praised universal jurisdiction as a 
backstop to other national prosecutions and a tool to prevent impunity for international 
crimes.   
 
In subsequent years, delegates have debated the appropriate division of labor 
between the Sixth Committee and the ILC. These debates reveal a wide dissensus among 
member states and suggest the likelihood of gridlock should the ILC recommend a treaty 
based on draft articles. Several delegates called for referring the universal jurisdiction 
agenda item to the Commission for further study, stressing “the fundamentally juridical 
and technical nature of the subject.”66  Others opined that “[b]ecause the Committee was 
a political body and the [ILC] an expert one, it was more appropriate for the Commission 
to study the topic further.” 67 In further discussions in 2013, Uganda’s representative 
echoed this sentiment, asking “If not in this forum [the UNGA’s Sixth Committee], then 
where?”68 
 
The disagreements in the General Assembly over foreign official immunity and 
universal jurisdiction have sent conflicting signals to the ILC. On the one hand, state 
views on the scope of immunity are polarized. Perhaps for this reason, the Commission 
has to date deferred difficult questions about whether exceptions to immunity exist. At 
the same time, the General Assembly has opened another front on a closely-related issue. 
Not only have similar divisions among states emerged in the Sixth Committee’s 
discussion of universal jurisdiction. The practice of forum shopping within the General 
Assembly as a means of fracturing opinion, rather than building consensus in favor of a 
single approach, has called into question the reception the ILC’s work will receive. In 
sum, this example illustrates the dangers of trying to win consensus on a treaty, and the 
advantages for the Commission of looking beyond the General Assembly to find an 
audience for its work. 
 
The renewed importance of customary international law methodology 
 
Our primary claim in this chapter is that gridlock in the UNGA affects the ILC’s 
choice of work product. In this section, we make a second claim: that the shift away from 
preparing draft treaties increases the salience of the methodology that the ILC uses to 
enhance its influence. As the ILC’s ability to promulgate texts that will be adopted as                                                         
65 Id. 
66 General Assembly of the U.N., Sixth Comm., Sixty-Sixth Session: The Scope and Application 
of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction; see also U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 13h mtg., at ¶¶ 15, 22 , UN 
Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.13 (Oct. 18, 2012). 
67 Id. 
68 Press Release, U.N. GAOR, At Conclusion of Sixth Committee Debate, Delegates Cite Abuse of 
Universal Jurisdiction, ‘Lip Service’ to Fight Against Impunity, GA/L/3462 (Oct. 18, 2013); see also U.N. 
GAOR, 67th Sess., 13th mtg., at ¶9, UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.13 (Oct. 18, 2012); Press Release, U.N. GAOR, 
Delegations Urge Clear Rules to Avoid Abuse of Universal Jurisdiction Principle, Seek Further Guidance 
from International Law Commission, GA/L/3341 (Oct. 17, 2012).   
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treaties narrows, the Commission has an increased interest in having states and other 
actors accept its non-binding texts as CIL. Yet, these actors may have doubts about the 
persuasive value of ILC texts that lack the General Assembly’s blessing. Adherence to a 
methodology can alleviate these worries by providing an alternative mechanism to limit 
the ILC’s discretion when the traditional constraint of UNGA review is unavailable due 
to gridlock.  The Commission can use the constraints of methodology, in other words, to 
persuade other actors that its non-treaty outputs possess the properties of rule-
legitimacy—determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence—that Thomas 
Franck famously identified. 69 But what methodology has this effect? The traditional 
sources of CIL are one plausible choice. At the same time, the ILC may wish to adopt 
approaches that give it relatively more discretion.  
 
In what follows, we first discuss the rising importance of methodology as a 
constraint on the ILC. We then explore the new light that methodology sheds on the 
sources the Commission has used in its ongoing codification of the law of foreign official 
immunity. 
 
Can methodology constrain the ILC? 
 
At the outset, we confront the question of whether CIL methodology matters at 
all. As much scholarship has emphasized, the traditional test for CIL is plagued by 
indeterminacy. This indeterminacy, in turn, has led scholars to question whether 
methodology does any work in shaping the content of the CIL. In her contribution to this 
volume, Monica Hakimi writes that “because the CIL process is so unstructured, it lacks 
the formal controls that might inhibit the participants from pushing hard for their 
preferred norms—making the opportunistic claims that methods for finding CIL try to 
weed out.”70 And as Curtis Bradley suggests in his analysis of the adjudication of CIL, 
the content of custom is determined by a process analogous to the common law, in which 
judges make choice that are shaped by “assessments of state preferences as well as social 
and moral considerations.”71 If the preferences of states, judges and other actors about 
substantive norms are all that matter, methodology would appear to exert little if any 
force in constraining competing claims about the content of CIL. 
  
We disagree with these approaches, at least as applied to the ILC’s articulation of 
custom. To be clear, we are not saying that the methodology the ILC adopts will produce 
determinate answers in all, or even in many, circumstances. But a methodology does not 
have to produce determinate answers in order to narrow the set of claims that actors may 
make about the content of rules.72 Our claim is thus a more modest one: the methodology 
that the ILC uses to identify custom limits the set of rules that the Commission can                                                         
69 THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990). 
70  Monica Hakimi, Custom’s Process and Method: Lessons from Humanitarian Law (in this 
volume) [manuscript p.11]. 
71 Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication (in 
this volume) [manuscript p.1]. 
72 Cf. Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 213 
(2008) (noting, in a discussion of the relative constraining effect of different theories of constitutional 
interpretation, that “no sensible legal system eliminates discretion entirely.”). 
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plausibly advance to influence the content of CIL through non-treaty outputs. To be sure, 
the ILC retains discretion in interpreting what custom requires, but that discretion is 
limited by how faithfully the Commission adheres to the methodology it espouses. 
Indeed, as we explain below, expert bodies like the ILC are more constrained by 
methodology than are other international actors. 
 
The following thought experiment helps to illustrate these points. If method 
exerted no constraining influence whatsoever, the Commission could simply submit a list 
of proposed rules to the UNGA, perhaps backed by policy justifications. The rules’ 
success would not need to be justified in terms of practice (state or otherwise), opinio 
juris, or other claims to legality, and we would not expect the ILC or other actors to 
spend any time canvassing these sources or couching their arguments in those terms. In 
reality, however, we do see actors, and especially the ILC, discussing CIL in terms of 
doctrine.  
 
Consistency in adhering to a methodology is also in the Commission’s self-
interest. When the ILC engages in progressive development, it is not limited to 
examining the two traditional requisites of custom—widespread and extensive state 
practice and opinio juris.  It is instead free to advance proposals for new international 
rules or extensions of existing rules that have yet to garner general support from states. 
For codification, in contrast, the Statute contemplates reliance on “extensive State 
practice, precedent and doctrine,” an arguably stricter evidentiary standard that imposes 
somewhat greater constraints on the ILC’s norm generating activities. 
 
As we explained in the previous section, the ILC in its early years demonstrated a 
preference for draft articles that it anticipated would be approved by the UNGA as  
multilateral treaties.  This choice of work product gave the Commission relatively wide 
discretion to support draft texts with whatever evidence was available—whether or not 
that evidence was sufficient, or even relevant, to prove an existing custom—and to elide 
the often abstruse distinction between codification and progressive development.73  Yet 
the ILC exercised this discretion in the shadow of UNGA review.  If its members strayed 
too far from what the political winds would bear, they risked having the draft articles 
rejected or returned for further study and revision.   
 
In response to increasing gridlock in the UNGA and pressure to take on more 
unsettled or contentious topics, the ILC has shifted to work products that do not 
contemplate the adoption of new conventions.  Crucially, as explained above, these more 
malleable outputs—unlike the Commission’s progressive development work—do not 
require formal approval by the UNGA to influence the content of international law 
(although such approval is of course desirable).  Yet because these work products are 
generated pursuant to the ILC’s delegated authority to codify extant custom rather than 
extend the law in new directions, their influence with other international and domestic 
                                                        
73 See, e.g., Lauterpacht, supra note 32, at 17.  
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actors depends upon the extent to which the Commission supports its proposals with 
persuasive evidence that a putative custom in fact exists.74  
 
Seen from this perspective, the methodology that the ILC employs to create its 
work product may function as a de facto substitute for the political blessing traditionally 
associated with the UNGA’s adoption of draft articles and preparation of multilateral 
conventions.  That is, under conditions of UNGA gridlock, the Commission’s choice of 
the codification track gives it greater discretion to select its preferred output (principles, 
conclusions, freestanding draft texts, and so forth), minimizing the possibility of rebuke 
or sanction from a hamstrung UNGA.  Yet if those outputs are in fact to influence 
international law through uptake by actors other than the UNGA, the ILC must convince 
those actors that the methodology it employs to produce those outputs is itself valid.  The 
need to persuade these actors serves as a check on the ILC that cabins its discretion to 
shape the content of international rules. In Franck’s terms, the ILC gives its non-treaty 
outputs legitimacy through adherence to methodology, because the legitimacy available 
through the political approval process is foreclosed.  
 
Significantly, the Commission’s use of methodology as a mechanism of 
persuasion need not apply to other actors who advance claims about CIL. Some bodies 
may enjoy such widespread legitimacy and political support that they need not adhere to 
a particular methodology in order to have their pronouncements followed. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which makes claims about customary 
international humanitarian law (IHL), may provide an example of this kind of institution. 
As Hakimi says, the ICRC’s studies have had broad influence on customary IHL even 
though the extent to which they accurately reflect custom is contested.75 Well-established 
and widely respected tribunals, such as the German Constitutional Court or the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, provide another example.76  
 
By contrast, institutions in newly emerging or fragile democracies—such as the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century, Eastern European courts in the 
1990s, intellectual property agencies in the Andean Community in the late 1980s—must 
develop legitimacy over time.77 One strategy for doing so is to apply methodology even-
handedly to a range of problems. Developing a reputation for applying methodology 
consistently may insulate a judicial, administrative, or other expert body from claims that 
it is simply resolving distributive conflicts in accordance with its (or some other actor’s)                                                         
74 Cf. Murphy, supra note 1 (noting that the “persuasive value” of non-binding codifications 
“would turn on their intrinsic merits”). 
75 Hakimi, supra note 70, at __. It bears noting, however, that the ICRC study gave careful and 
extensive attention to methodology in the introductory chapter of its monumental study of customary IHL. 
See International Committee of the Red Cross, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
xxxvii-xlviii (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). 
76 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 71, at [manuscript pp. 23-24] (discussing factors relating to 
judicial authority to develop custom).  
77 See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the 
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2001) 
(discussing constitutional courts); Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter and M. Florencia Guerzovich, Islands 
of Effective International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean 
Community, 103 AM. J INT’L L. 1(2009) (discussing administrative agencies).  
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preferences.78 Adherence to methodology, in other words, can enhance the influence of 
an institution seeking to garner widespread legitimacy.  
 
This is true as well for the ILC under conditions of UNGA gridlock. Of course, 
the Commission has been codifying and progressively developing CIL for decades and, 
as a result, has built a reputation as a highly respected expert body. But that expertise—
and the discretion that comes with it—was developed in light of certain expectations 
about the review of its work by U.N. political bodies. With the membership of those 
bodies increasingly divided, the opportunity for meaningful review has diminished. It 
should not be surprising, therefore, that the Commission would turn to other 
mechanisms—in particular methodology—as a way to maintain and even expand its 
influence under very different circumstances.  
 
The role of methodology in the ILC’s recent work  
 
The ILC thus has an interest in adhering to a methodology in how it pursues its 
work. That methodology, however, need not be the traditional inquiry into state practice 
and opinio juris. Rather, the Commission may augment its influence by consistently 
employing an approach that deviates from the traditional mode of identifying CIL. We 
consider that possibility here.  
 
At first blush, the idea of tinkering with methodology to expand discretion and 
broaden influence may seem inconsistent with the idea of using methodology as a 
constraint. Although there is undeniably a tension, the two approaches are not 
incompatible. A judge, for example, may select a preferred method of constitutional 
interpretation because she believes it reaches results that accord most of the time with her 
preferred interpretation of the law. Yet to maintain credibility with litigants and other 
actors, the judge may still feel compelled to adhere to that methodology even in cases in 
which it produces a result the judge does not like.   
 
More specifically, we expect the ILC to select and, relatively consistently, adhere 
to a methodological approach aimed at attracting the support of the audience it hopes to 
persuade. Actors who are convinced by a strict approach to codification outside of treaty-
making will be most convinced by ILC work products that closely adhere to the 
traditional requisites of custom.  If this view predominates, we would expect the 
Commission to carefully investigate all potentially relevant sources of custom—including 
affirmative state practice by specially affected countries, acquiescence by other nations, 
and evidence and inferences of opinio juris.  The ILC may even solicit the views of 
governments to bolster its findings based on these traditional sources.79   
 
                                                        
78 Cf. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981) (analyzing 
how courts maintain legitimacy in a triadic structure that requires them to take sides between two opposed 
parties). 
79 Indeed, when the ILC engages in progressive development it is required to solicit governments’ 
views.  See ILC Statute, art. 16(c). 
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On the other hand, executive branch officials are acutely aware that both their 
actions and their utterances in international law-related venues will be scrutinized for any 
hints about the existence or emergence of custom.  They may, as a result, be reluctant to 
express a position that could later be used against them and instead couch their statements 
in deliberately vague or ambiguous language.  To the extent that the Commission sticks 
to the canonical test for CIL, this reticence creates a challenge for the ILC’s ability to 
make claims about extant custom. Similarly, the rise of countries such as India and 
China, and their growing willingness and capacity to contest the emergence of new 
customary norms contrary to their interests, 80  makes establishing the veneer of a 
“consistent state practice” all the more difficult, precisely because more states may seek 
to prevent a consensus about a putative legal rule from emerging.  
 
If traditional indications of state practice and opinio juris are scarce or conflicting, 
the Commission may seek to expand the sources and materials it considers beyond those 
that states can manipulate directly.  By giving weight to sources such as international and 
national court decisions, expert studies, resolutions of international organizations, and the 
Commission’s own past work, the ILC can expand its ability to prepare codification-
related work products not supported by canonical evidence of custom.  Moreover, since 
the actors who can informally bless these outputs are not limited to states, concerns about 
deviating from a strict approach to custom may be reduced. This methodological move 
may thus liberate the ILC from some of the constraints imposed by conflicting state 
practice or political factions.   
 
The ILC’s study of foreign official immunity provides more support for the latter 
position—that the ILC relies today on evidence beyond canonical state practice and 
opinio juris—than the former.  The Kolodkin and Escobar Hernandez reports—and the 
heated debates they engendered—do not contain detailed, country-by-country analyses of 
state practice as expressed, for example, in official government actions or 
pronouncements regarding immunity rules or their exceptions.  The documents and 
discussions evince even less treatment of opinio juris.  To the extent that traditional 
indicia of custom are referenced at all, they appear in the form of national legislation and 
executive branch positions taken in domestic litigation. 
 
By far the most common evidence cited are ICJ judgments and national court 
decisions, as well as the views expressed by state representatives during debates in the 
Sixth Committee of the UNGA and other international forums.  The Escobar Hernandez 
Third Report provides an illustrative example. In considering evidence of how the term 
“official” is defined in international law, the Report considers, in order, national judicial 
practice, international judicial practice, treaty practice, and other works of the 
Commission. 81  Of these, only treaty practice—listed third—is classic state practice                                                         
80 See, e.g., Zhu Lijiang, Chinese Practice in Public International Law: 2013, 13 CHINESE J. INT’L 
L. 395 (2014); Sunil T. Rao, India, in SOURCES OF STATE PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 262-67 (Ralph 
Gaebler & Alison Shea eds., 2014).  The dispute between India and Italy over the shooting of two Indian 
fishermen by Italian military guards aboard the ship Enrica Lexie provides an apt illustration. See Hari 
Sankar, Jurisdictional and Immunity Issues in the Story of Enrica Lexie, EJILTalk! (Mar. 25, 2013). 
81 See Escobar Hernandez Third Report, supra note 52.  
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geared towards foreign relations, although it may reveal little about whether the treaty has 
passed into customary international law.82  
  
With respect to the views expressed by state representatives, these statements 
might be considered a type of state practice, but their declarative content gives them 
greater weight as opinio juris, although it is an opinio juris inflected through the 
distinctive political environment of the international venues in which they are made and 
the recognition by states of the legal value (or lack thereof) of such statements.  In 
addition, the extensive focus on methodological questions about codifying versus 
progressively developing international law suggests a desire by ILC members to be 
transparent about the Commission’s role as it prepares draft articles and other work 
products for consideration by a wider community of actors. 
 
In this way, the ILC’s recent work product reveals that a strong form of the 
critique of customary international law is misguided—at least when applied to the 
Commission. While existing CIL methodology may be imprecise relative to the clear 
procedures that accompany treaty-making, institutions such as the ILC have an incentive 
to clarify custom’s methodology as a way to increase their own influence. Indeed, the 
ILC has undertaken this task with its ongoing project on the “Formation and evidence of 
customary international/identification of customary international law.”83 The outcome of 
that process promises to limit, and by so limiting also expand, the ILC’s importance in a 
post-treaty world. 
 
The ILC faces a twin challenge. On the one hand, its influence likely requires 
working with materials beyond the canonical approach to CIL that privileges the actions 
and words of states. In a multipolar world, such inquiries will increasingly reveal sources 
that are conflicting or unclear. On the other hand, the ILC must devise methodological 
limits on its discretion to win acceptance for its more diverse work products. We 
therefore expect the ILC to surrender voluntarily some amount of discretion as the price 
of achieving legitimacy in the eyes of critical stakeholders, including the international 
bar, international judges, NGOs, and IOs. A renewed dedication to methodology by the 
ILC, in other words, functions as a costly commitment device. The ILC surrenders some 
discretion in customary lawmaking in exchange for furthering the influence of its non-
treaty outputs in shaping international law in the twenty-first century. In short, the 
benefits of methodological constraints provide a reason internal to the operation of law—
and consistent with the Commission’s self-interest—for it to adhere to methodology.  
                                                         
82 The status of national court judicial decisions as state practice was long viewed with skepticism. 
Today most, but not all, commentators accept such decisions as state practice at least where they represent 
the authoritative statements of a nation’s position about custom in a particular area. See Ingrid Wuerth, 
International Law in Domestic Courts and the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Case, 13 MELB. J. 
INT’L L. 819, 821-22 (2012); see also Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of 
National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57, 62 (2011) 
(noting that such treatment complicated by the fact that national court decisions “play a distinctive dual role 
in the doctrine of sources: as evidence of State practice . . . and as a subsidiary means of determining the 
existence and content international law . . . .”). 
83 For ILC documents relating to this project, see http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.htm. 
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Of course, these arguments do not allow us to show empirically that the ILC is in 
fact constrained by methodology. Our hope, however, is to test our hypothesis in future 
work. The simultaneous consideration of foreign official immunity in the ILC and the 
closely related topic of universal jurisdiction in the political Sixth Committee creates a 
kind of natural experiment. If our hypothesis regarding methodology is correct, we would 
expect the ILC, constrained to some degree by methodology, to reach different results 
than the Sixth Committee.    
 
Conclusion 
 
The International Law Commission is an institution at a crossroads. Since the 
1980s its tried-and-true method of lawmaking—preparing draft treaty articles that skirt 
the line between codification and progressive development—has been stalled by gridlock 
in the General Assembly. To reassert its influence, the Commission has increasingly 
turned to non-binding codifications of customary international law. Yet since the legal 
force of these non-binding codifications turns on their status and acceptance as CIL, the 
methodology by which the ILC justifies its work has become increasingly important. 
Methodology, in effect, confers a legitimacy on the Commission’s work product that the 
political treaty-making process no longer can. 
 
These shifts in the ILC’s practice may reflect larger trends in international 
lawmaking. We therefore conclude this chapter with some preliminary reflections on the 
generalizability of two aspects of our study: (1) the decline of broad-based multilateral 
treaty-making, and (2) the distinction between lawmaking by political and expert bodies. 
 
The General Assembly’s slow pace of treaty-making is in line with broader trends 
in international lawmaking. On difficult issues ranging from climate change to closing 
the Doha Round at the World Trade Organization, governments have been unable to 
sustain the pace of multilateral lawmaking that characterized the second half of the 
twentieth century. Indeed, in many issue areas lawmaking seems to be shifting to regional 
fora.84 This broader trend suggests that gridlock within the UNGA may not simply be a 
reflection of “easy” topics having already been codified. Rather, it may indicate a more 
fundamental breakdown of political consensus about critical legal issues, as well as a 
destabilization of power relationships that have long shaped the international lawmaking 
agenda.  
 
The combination of these factors may have increased the transaction costs of 
multilateral treaty-making to such a degree that states are forced to look for alternative 
and less costly avenues of lawmaking, including soft law, customary international law, 
international tribunals, and regional organizations. But if the General Assembly’s 
gridlock is a symptom of these broader trends, further shifts in interstate power 
relationships or the emergence of a new consensus on particular topics may reanimate the 
UNGA. Our findings in this chapter suggest that, should these changes occur, the ILC                                                         
84 See, for example, the plethora of regional trade agreements as well as the increased activity of 
regional and sub-regional organizations like the African Union, ASEAN, and ECOWAS.  
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will pivot back towards treaty-making, preferring the political endorsement of its work to 
more amorphous and diverse pathways to legitimacy and acceptance. 
 
The relationship between the UNGA and the ILC also highlights an increasingly 
important distinction between expert and political bodies. Expert bodies like the ILC 
have come to play an increasingly important role in lawmaking in recent decades. The 
judicialization of some areas of international law is one manifestation of this trend.85 In 
other areas, however, intergovernmental institutions comprised of experts who generally 
lack formal lawmaking authority have assumed a greater role in coordinating state 
behavior and in laying the groundwork for interstate negotiations. Examples include the 
International Renewable Energy Agency, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), or the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation 
Protection.86 Expert bodies differ from political bodies like the UNGA or diplomatic 
conferences in that they generally operate by producing information—such as reports and 
recommendations—rather than directly generating new legal rules. This information 
often serves as the basis of subsequent international regulation.  
 
The rise of expert bodies is often attributed to the increasing complexity of 
international problems and their potential solutions. In responding to this complexity, 
technocratic expertise may produce better governance outcomes than political bargaining. 
Yet the relationships between political and expert bodies remain poorly understood. In 
particular, we lack a well-developed account of whether delegating international 
lawmaking—or governance functions more generally—to expert bodies like the ILC 
produces different substantive outcomes or alters distributional issues. Questions to be 
explored include the following: When and why do states delegate responsibility for 
international governance to expert, as opposed to political, bodies? Do expert bodies that 
operate under intergovernmental supervision produce systematically different results 
from intergovernmental political bodies themselves? Are certain states systematically 
advantaged by the use of expert bodies? What factors influence the decision to delegate 
to one type of body or another? And what factors influence their effectiveness? Our study 
of the ILC suggests that widespread political support for expert bodies may be a 
sufficient but not a necessary condition for their effectiveness. Expert bodies will 
continue to seek opportunities to influence the evolution of international law even in the 
absence of a political consensus on the content of their work. 
 
 
                                                        
85 See, e.g., Cesare P. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of 
the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (1999); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Prospects for 
the Increased Independence of International Tribunals, 7 GERMAN L.J. 1057 (2011); Laurence R. Helfer & 
Karen J. Alter, Legitimacy and Lawmaking: A Tale of Three International Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQ. IN 
L. 479 (2013). 
86  See Timothy Meyer, Epistemic Institutions and Epistemic Governance in International 
Environmental Law, 2 TRANSNAT’L ENVIRON. L. 15 (2013) (analyzing the decision to divorce the 
International Renewable Energy Agency from multilateral lawmaking institutions); Oren Perez, The Hybrid 
Legal-Scientific Dynamic of Transnational Scientific Institutions, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2015).   
